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LIABILITY OF HOSPITAL FOR INJURIES TO PATIENTS
USING HOSPITAL FACILITIES
A PATIENT injured while receiving medical treatment in a hospital often
seeks redress from the hospital as well as from the immediate tortfeasor.
In addition to the usual subjects of inquiry in tort suits, courts are accus-
tomed to consider both the character of the hospital and the functional rela-
tionship to the hospital of the perpetrator of the injury. Hospitals are com-
monly either privately conducted for profit, charitable, public, or industrial. 1
Besides employing a resident staff of physicians, surgeons, specialists and
nurses, many hospitals extend the privileges of the institution to independent
doctors and nurses who wish to attend private patients there. Charitable and
public hospitals have, in addition, an active visiting staff appointed primarily
to care for the indigent sick.2 On the basis of these factual variations in hos-
pital organization, the courts have assembled a complicated catalogue of
classification and sub-classification. The question of compensation for an
injured patient is more often answered by perfunctory reference to this card
index system than by practical resolution of two obviously competing pub-
lic needs. Rules of liability should be framed to assure competent medical
care, and yet the development of hospital facilities must not be discouraged.
On the basis of these two considerations, this Comment will appraise the
existing rules of hospital liability for the torts of medical and nursing staffs.
Private hospitals conducted for profit are subject to the same standards
of legal liability as other business enterprises. As a result, these establish-
ments are usually held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for
torts committed by resident physicians and nurses, however carefully the
1. Private hospitals for profit are organized and operated by the owners as regular
business enterprises. See LAPP AND KETcHAut, HosPrrAL L.w (1926) 37. The purpose
of charitable hospitals is to care for the sick among either particular groups or the public
generally, by means of funds acquired principally through charitable contributions and
sometimes also from patients. Id. at 24. See Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hos-
pital, 109 Fed. 294, 295 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901) ; McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Association,
122 Minn. 10, 13, 141 N. V. 837, 838 (1913). A public hospital is owned, managed and
controlled exclusively by some governmental unit for members of the general public.
LAPP AND KETCHAm, Hospvrra. LAW (1926) 16. Industrial hospitals are organized by em-
ployers for the benefit of employees and are operated either as a charity or for the
profit of the employer. See Union Pacific Railroad v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365, 36S (C. C. A.
8th, 1894).
There are in the United States 2,693 non-profit hospitals with 277,717 beds; 1,183
individual and partnership hospitals with 29,957 beds; 530 corporation hospitals (un-
restricted as to profit) with 28,085 beds; 1,722 governmental hospitals with 788,749
beds. Industrial hospitals are listed as 36 in number with 2,835 beds but no indication
is given as to ownership. A EraicA, MEDicAL AssocUTIoN, CMasus oF HOSr'MUiS
(1937).
2. See MACEACHEaN, HosprrL. ORGANNIZATION AND MAXAGEME.Er (1935) 156-159.
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staff was selected.3  This liability has been imposed for the negligence of
medical agents both in performing acts demanding professional skill and acts
requiring only lay competence. The oft-repeated rationale runs that pri-
vate hospitals conducted for profit have the duty to use reasonable care in
safeguarding a patient, and this duty is limited only by the capacity of the
patient to provide for his own safety.4  For example, private profit hos-
pitals have been held liable in cases5 which involve the burning of uncon-
scious patients by hot water bottles, packs and poultices ;o errors in operating
room technique including anesthetics, hypodermics and injections ;7 improper
surgical and medical treatment;8 self-inflicted injuries which might have
been prevented by more constant attention to infants0 and insane and de-
3. Norwood Hospital v. Brown, 219 Ala. 445, 122 So. 411 (1929); Parrish v.
Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933); Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanitarium Co.,
224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S. W. (2d) 249 (1929) ; Malcolm v. Evangelical Lutheran Hospi-
tal Association, 107 Neb. 101, 185 N. W. 330 (1921); Jenkins v. Charlestown General
Hospital, 90 W.Va. 230, 110 S. E. 560 (1922). Contra: Kamps v. Crown Heights
Hospital, 251 App. Div. 849, 296 N. Y. Supp. 776 (2d Dep't 1937).
4. See Robertson v. Charles B. Towns Hospital, 178 App. Div. 285, 287, 165
N. Y. Supp. 17, 18 (2d Dep't 1917) ; Hayhurst v. Boyd Hospital, 43 Idaho 661, 669, 254
Pac. 528, 529 (1927) ; Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App. 550, 556, 288 S. W. 69, 72 (1926) ;
Tulsa Hospital v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 247, 175 Pac. 519, 523 (1918); Hogan v. Clarks-
burg Hospital Co., 63 W. Va. 84, 89, 59 S. E. 943, 945 (1907).
5. An analysis of 55 malpractice cases representing 65 hospitals from 1928 to 1933
showed that 23% were for burns from hot water bottles, packs and poultices; 17.7%
for errors in operating room technique including anesthetics, hypodermics and injections;
10% for self-inflicted injuries which might have been prevented by more constant atten-
tion to insane and delirious patients; 10% f6r self-inflicted injuries by sane patients due
to a lack of attention; 12% for injuries from X-ray, violet-ray, diathermy; 7.4% for
injuries in postnatal maternity cases; 2.4% for improper surgical dressings; 7.2% imiscel-
laneous. See Martin, Professional Liability Insurance for Hospitals (1933) 7 BULL.
AmERICAN HOSPITAL ASsoCIATIoN, no. 7, 10 at 14.
6. Meyer v. Hospital, 173 Cal. 156, 159 Pac. 436 (1916); Phillips v. Buffalo
General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924); Duke Sanitarium v. I-learn,
159 Okla. 1, 13 P. (2d) 183 (1932); Harber v. Gledhill, 60 Utah 391, 208 Pac. 1111
(1922).
7. Objects left in wound after operation: Payne v. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital,
2 Cal. App. (2d) 270, 37 P. (2d) 1061 (1934); Armstrong v. Wallace, 37 P. (2d)
467, rehearing 8 Cal. App. (2d) 429, 47 P. (2d) 740 (1935); Penland v. French Broad
Hospital, 199 N. C. 314, 154 S. E. 406 (1930). Negligent incision: Jeter v. Davis-
Fischer Sanatorium, 28 Ga. App. 708, 113 S. E. 29 (1922). Hypodermatoclysis resulted
in injury: Malcolm v. Evangelical Lutheran Hospital Association, 107 Neb. 101, 185
N. W. 330 (1921). Negligence in operating: Gilstrap v. Osteopathic Sanatorium Co.,
224 Mo. App. 798, 24 S. W. (2d) 249 (1929).
8. Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 48 (1933) (saline solution injected
though having a noticeably ill effect).
9. See Maxie v. Laurel General Hospital, 130 Miss. 246, 248, 93 So. 817 (1922);
Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 291, 160 N. Y. Supp. 401, 402
(Sup. Ct. 1916).
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lirious patients ;1o and negligently maintained premises directly contributing
to the injury of patients." Maintaining safe premises and guarding men-
tally irresponsible patients require only lay capacity and hence fall reason-
ably within the doctrine of respondeat superior. But the other enumerated
defalcations are hardly within the control of hospitals, for they may be due
to mistakes in medical judgment made by carefully selected physicians and
nurses who are employed to practice their profession according to their
own discretion." This consideration has led some of the New York courts
to reject the doctrine that a private hospital operated for profit is liable for
the torts of its medical staff no matter how carefully selected and to limit
liability to cases of negligently chosen personnel. S Hospitals do not prac-
tice medicine through agents, it is said, but rather are places where profes-
sional practitioners can give medical treatment to patients.14 Of course,
hospitals can be required to use reasonable care and diligence in selecting
staff physicians and nurses,15 for the hospital may control the quality of
medical service rendered on its premises by exercising the privilege of ap-
pointing physicians, surgeons and nurses to its resident and visiting staffs,
and by extending the use of the hospital premises to the courtesy staff."'
10. Durfee v. Dorr, 123 Ark. 542, 186 S. WV. 62 (1916); Hawthorne v. Blythewood,
118 Conn. 617, 174 Atl. 81 (1934) ; Hignite's Administratrix Y. Louisville Neuropathic
Sanatorium, 223 Ky. 497, 2 S. X.V. (2d) 407 (1928) ; Smith v. Simpson, 221 Mo. App.
550, 288 S. W. 69 (1926); Maki v. Murray Hospital, 91 Mont. 251, 7 P. (2d) 228
(1932) ; Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity Association, 96 Neb. 636, 148 N. W. 592 (1914);
Hogan v. Hospital Co., 63 NV. Va. 84, 59 S. E. 943 (1907).
11. Baker v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford University, 133 Cal. App. 243,
23 P. (2d) 1071 (1933) (insulation on light switch broken and patient shocked) ; Tulsa
Hospital Association v. Juby, 73 Okla. 243, 175 Pac. 519 (1918) (roof leaked on patient
after operation). But cf. Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911) (physi-
cian operating private hospital for profit not responsible for failure to furnish adequate
place for patient's surgeon to operate, but surgeon held responsible).
12. See Schloendorff v. N. Y. Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 131, 105 N. E. 92, 94 (1914).
13. This is the present rule in the lower courts of New York. The New York
Court of Appeals has not discussed the rule directly, though apparently it grew out of a
dictum in one of the Court of Appeals opinions. Matter of Renouf %. New York Central
R. R., 254 N. Y. 349, 351, 173 N. E. 218, 219 (1930) (employees liability case). See
Mills v. Society of New York Hospital, 242 App. Div. 245, 274 N. Y. Supp. 233 (2d
Dep't 1934), aff'd without opinion 270 N. Y. 594, 1 N. E. (2d) 346; Hendrickson v.
Hodkin, 250 App. Div. 619, 294 N. Y. Supp. 9M' (2d Dep't 1937), rev'd on other
grounds, 276 N. Y. 252, 11 N. B. (2d) 899; Kamps v. Crown Heights Hospital, 251
App. Div. 849, 296 N. Y. Supp. 776 (2d Dep't 1937).
14. See Daly's Astoria Sanitarium, 161 Misc. 716, 719, 291 N. Y. Supp. 105,
1009 (City Ct, 1936); cf. Mills v. Society of New York Hospital, 242 App. Div. 245,
274 N. Y. Supp. 233 (2d Dep't 1934).
15. See note 13, supra.
16. See Bachmeyer, The Hospital and the Medical Profession (1935) 9 BUa.
AaIcAx HosprrAL AssocATiox, no. 7, 30 at 35; Walsh, The Responsibility of the
Hospital Board of Trustees for the Standards of Professional Performance (Nov., 1935)
HosPrrALs, 63; Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hospital, 78 L. J. 958, 101 L T. R. 3653
(K. B., 1909).
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Even when indiscriminately applied, the doctrine of rcspondcal superio
does not extend so far as to render the hospital liable for the torts of physi-
cians and nurses who practice on hospital premises in the independent em-
ployment of private patients. 17 However, the practical difficulties in deter-
mining when a medical employee is acting as the agent of a patient or his
physician and when he is acting as the agent of the hospital have led to con-
flicting results. A staff nurse performing her duties in the operating room
is deemed the agent of the surgeon performing the operation, 8 while one
carrying out a physician's orders in the patient's room during the physi-
cian's absence may be held to be acting for the hospital, 19 or only for the
physician.20 A hospital nurse who continues an obviously deleterious treat-
ment renders the hospital liable even though the treatment had been ordered
by the patient's own physician ;21 and some courts have gone so far as to
hold that a surgeon who is a principal officer and stockholder of a private
hospital operated for profit may be working in the hospital as the agent of
a patient rather than of the hospital. 22 Since the hospital cannot control the
countless discretionary acts and movements of physicians or nurses regard-
less of whether they are held to be agents of the hospital or of the patient,
2-
such distinctions seem both specious and arbitrary. Hence the minority doc-
trine, limiting the liability of private profit hospitals for the negligence of
medical agents to cases where due care has not been used in their selection,
seems more closely correlated to a feasible degree of control.
24
17. Barfield v. South Highlands Infirmary, 191 Ala. 553, 68 So. 30 (1915) ; Simons
v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P. (2d) 609 (1933); Gosnell v.
Southern Railway Co., 202 N. C. 234, 162 S. E. 569 (1932); Holland v. Eugene
Hospital, 127 Ore. 256, 270 Pac. 784 (1928).
18. Armstrong v. Wallace, 37 P. (2d) 467 (1934), rchearing 8 Cal. App. (2d) 429,
47 P. (2d) 740 (1935) ; Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La., 1922) ; Sehloen-
dorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914) ; Aderhold
v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923) (surgeon held liable for negligence of
staff nurse during operation); Wolfe v. Mosler Safe Co., 139 App. Div. 848, 124
N. Y. Supp. 541 (4th Dep't 1910). See (1929) 4 TULANE L. REV. 139.
19. Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, 170 So. 801 (La., 1936).
20. Simons v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P. (2d) 609 (1933);
Randolph v. Oklahoma City General Hospital, 180 Okla. 513, 71 P. (2d) 607 (1937).
But cf. Bowditch v. French Broad Hospital, 201 N. C. 168, 159 S. E. 350 (1931)
(patient by asking hospital nurse if he might leave hospital made her his own agent) ;
Kuglich v. Fowle, 185 Wis. 124, 200 N. W. 648 (1924) (doctor discharged hospital
of responsibility when he performed some of staff nurse's functions himself).
21. Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933) ; see Byrd v. Marion General
Hospital, 202 N. C. 337, 341, 162 S. E. 738, 740 (1932).
22. Black v. Fischer, 30 Ga. App. 109, 117 S. E. 103 (1923); Stacy v. Williams,
253 Ky. 353, 69 S. W. (2d) 697 (1934).
23. See Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 73,
135 N. E. 287, 291 (1922).
24. See Ware v. Culp, 74 P. (2d) 283, 287 (Cal., 1937) ; Schloendorff v. New York
Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 128, 105 N. E. 92, 94 (1914) ; In re Agnew's Will, 132 Misc.
466, 472, 230 N.Y. Supp. 519, 526 (Surr. Ct., 1928).
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That prevailing rules of hospital liability have little relation to practical
supervision of medical activities on hospital premises is further indicated
by the failure of the courts to require observance by the hospital of what
would seem to be an obvious duty-to see that incompetent practitioners are
not permitted the use of hospital facilities even under the heading of inde-
pendent contractors.2- Inasmuch as the managers of private hospitals con-
ducted for profit are better qualified to judge the competency of doctors
and nurses than the ordinary layman, and are privileged to exclude anyone
from practice on hospital premises,2 this duty would hardly be an onerous
one. Such was the approach recently taken by the New York Court of Ap-
peals. In the case of Hendrickson v. Hodkin2-7 a private hospital operated
for profit was held liable for permitting a layman to administer a so-called
"cancer-cure" on its premises, despite the fact that the patient himself had
retained the layman for the "cure."28 Although the hospital had contracted
only to provide room and board, the Court reasoned that its superintendent
owed a duty to the patient to forbid a charlatan the privileges of hospital
practice.29
A logical extension of the Hendrickson rule would hold hospitals to the
duty of permitting only competent physicians, surgeons and nurses the use
of hospital facilities, 30 whether they practice there as regular members of the
hospital staff or at the selection of the patient. Many practical difficulties,
25. See note 17, supra; 8 Buu.., AImucAx HosprrAL. AssoczaTo. (1934) no. 1, 9D.
26. Replogle v. Julia F. Burnham Hospital, 71 I11. App. 246 (1896); Stevens v.
Emergency Hospital, 142 Md. 526, 121 Ad. 475 (1923); Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W.
1068 (Tex. Civ. App., 1920) ; State ex rel. Wolfe v. LaCrosse Lutheran Hospital Asso-
ciation, 181 Wis. 33, 193 N. NV. 994 (1923). To standardize the treatment given in a
sanitarium a county medical association has the right to reject an osteopath as a
member. Gregg v. Massachusetts Medical Society, 111 Mass., 185, 15 Am. Rep. 24
(1872).
27. 276 N. Y. 252, 11 N. E. (2d) 899 (1937).
28. The patient was the victim of a tort at the hands of the layaMn. N. Y. EDucA-
Tiox LAw no. 1263, subd. 6. Brown v. Shyne, 242 N. Y. 176, 151 N. . 197 (1926).
The fact that the plaintiff retained the layman to commit a misdemeanor was not a
bar to his right of action, for the parties were not in pan delicto. Bolivar v. Monnat,
232 App. Div. 33, 248 N. Y. Supp. 722 (4th Dep't 1931).
29. Liability could have been founded on the ground that the staff nurse and internes
were negligent in continuing an obviously deleterious treatment for some time. Parrish
v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933); see Byrd v. Marion General Hospital,
202 N. C. 337, 341, 162 S. E. 738, 740 (1932).
30. Hospitals are liable if they knowingly permit their facilities to be used for
unlawful purposes. See Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 123, 134,
105 N. E. 92, 95 (1914) (a charitable hospital would be liable if it permitted its facilities
to be used for an unauthorized and therefore illegal operation on a patient). Compare
Hasselbach v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 173 App. Div. 89, 159 N. Y. Supp. 376 (1st
Dep't 1916) with Grawunder v. Beth Israel Hospital Association, 242 App. Div. 56,
272 N. Y. Supp. 171 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd 266 N. Y. 605, 195 N. E. 221 (1934)
(performance of an unlawful autopsy on a body committed to the exclusive care of
a hospital).
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however, may be encountered in adopting a standard of admittance by which
the conduct of the institution may be judged. Suggested criteria3 are
graduation from a recognized school of medicine, possession of a license
to practice medicine in the state, interneship of at least one year in an
approved hospital, 32 and a reputation of being an ethical and competent phy-
sician. Specialists should be required to have had sufficient training and
experience to warrant their recognition by the national society or examin-
ing board representing their specialty. Similar requirements might be adopt-
ed for internes and nurses.
Charitable 'hospitals have traditionally been favored with a broader scope
of immunity than private hospitals conducted for profit.3 3 According to
the great majority of cases, they are not liable for the torts of staff physi-
cians, surgeons and nurses as long as reasonable care has been used in their
selection.34 This result has been justified on the ground that the beneficiary
of a charity impliedly waives his right to sue in tort for the injuries negli-
gently caused by the carefully selected agents of his benefactor. 35 Moreover,
by means of the so-called trust fund theory, immunity has often been ex-
31. MAcEACHERN, HospITAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1935) 144-5; Mac-
Eachern, Two Decades of Hospital Standardization (1935) 9 BULL, AmERICAN HosrITAL
AssocAToN, no. 10, 32 at 34, 38.
32. The Council on Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical
Association and the Hospital Department of the Canadian Medical Association make
up the approved list of hospitals for internes. See MACEACHER, HOSPITAL ORGANI-
ZATION AND MANAGEMENT (1935) 144.
33. However, charitable hospitals have been held liable to non-beneficiaries for the
torts of their non-medical agents. Loefler v. Trustees of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt
Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 Atl. 301 (1917) (fireman injured through defective condition
of fire escape); Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910)
(journeyman mechanic injured on the premises while making boiler repairs); Murtha
v. New York Homeopathic Medical College, 228 N. Y. 183, 126 N. E. 722 (1920)
(ambulance negligently collided with a taxicab); Johnsen v. Staten Island Hospital,
246 App. Div. 638, 283 N. Y. Supp. 664 (2d Dep't 1935), aff'd without opinion, 265
N. Y. 658, 193 N. E. 432, aff'd on rehearing, 271 N. Y. 519, 2 N. E. (2d) 674 (1936)
(visitor to hospital injured by torn floor). See Hayt, Hospital Liability for Nefqlilence
(Dec. 1937) HOSPITALS, 90 at 91, 92.
34. England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 640, 61 P.
(2d) 48 (1936) ; Hawthorne v. Blythewood, 118 Conn. 617, 174 Atl. 81 (1934); Mikota
v. Sister of Mercy & Mercy Hospital, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918); Rudy
v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N. E. 126 (1926); Bise v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 181 Wash. 269, 43 P. (2d) 4 (1935). Contra: Mulliner v. Evangelisher
Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699 (1920) (Hospital not immune for
negligence in selecting employees, nor for their negligence if carefully selected).
35. See Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 304 (C. C. A.
1st, 1901) ("If a suffering man avails himself of their charity, he takes the risk of
malpractice, if their charitable agents have been carefully selected.") ; Baker v. Trustees
of Leland Stanford University, 133 Cal. App. 243, 245, 23 P. (2d) 1071, 1072 (1933);
Armstrong v. Wallace, 37 P. (2d) 467, 468 (1934), rehearing 8 Cal. App. (2d) 429,
433, 47 P. (2d) 740, 742 (1935).
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tended to include even negligence in such administrative acts as maintaining
safe premises and selecting the medical and nursing staffs with care."6 Scant
justification can be found in the usual reasoning of this theory that legal
responsibility for the careful selection of hospital staffs would dissipate
trust funds donated for charitable purposes, thereby contravening the wishes
of donors as well as discouraging further gifts.3 7 On the contrary, if the
governing body is permitted to employ those who are unskilled and incom-
petent, charitable funds may be diverted from their true purpose and become
a menace rather than an aid to intended beneficiaries.35 Likewise, the im-
plied waiver doctrine has been so vulnerable to common sense logic30 that
many courts have either simply declared that the doctrine of respondeat
szperior is inapplicable to the relationship between a charitable hospital and
its medical and nursing staffs, 40 or have taken refuge in the comfortable
36. Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Iii. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905);
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mlass. 66, 126 N. E. 392 (192-0); Downes
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. V. 42 (1894); Nicholas v. Evangelical
Deaconess Home & Hospital, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S. W. 643 (1920). But cf. Tucker V.
Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Glavin v. Rhode Island
Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1875) (modified by statute, R. L GFIZMIAL
LAWS (1909) c.213, #38); Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R. I. 22, 85 Aft. 120 (1912)
(Charitable hospital liable for the negligence of its servants at least to paying patients) ;
McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. NV. (2d) 917 (1936). Courts
relying on other than the trust fund theory hold charitable hospitals liable for breach of
express contracts to furnish skillful medical care. See (1921) 6 Coau;. L. Q. 184-7. Arm-
strong v. Vesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912) ; Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital,
96 Misc. 289, 160 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Sup. Ct., 1916). But cf. Powers v. Massachusetts
Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 303 (C.C. A. 1st, 1901) (contract for careful
service in a charitable hospital would be ultra vires).
37. See note 36, supra. The trust fund theory originated in the English decision
of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & F. 507 (1846). For a defense of this doctrine
and a criticism of the "waiver" and "respondeat superior" theories see McCaskill,
Respondeat Superior as Applicd it; Ne', York to Quasi Public and Eleemosynary Cor-
porations (1920) 5 Coa't. L. Q. 409, (1921) 6 Conm. L. Q. 56. Strangely enough, the
Massachusetts court has held that when a charitable hospital sued for money due for
board and room the defendant could counter-claim for negligence to question worth
of services rendered. Beverly Hospital v. Early, 197 N. E. 641 (Mass., 1935).
38. See Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 597, 83 S. E. 807, 809 (1914). But see
McCaskill, supra note 37, (1921) 6 Coast. L. Q. at 81.
39. "The doctrine of implied waiver is logically weak It rests on the patent fiction
that the patient has relinquished a known right by coming to the hospital for treatment."
Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 189, 146 N.E. 199, 200 (1924);
Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E. (2d) 28 (1937).
40. See Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 126, 33 At. 595, 604 (1895) ;
Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N. Y. 268, 270, 140 N. . 694 (1923) ("Such
a hospital undertakes not to heal or attempt to heal through the agency of others, but
merely to supply others who will heal or attempt to heal on their own responsibility.");
Morrison v. Henke, 165 XVis. 166, 170, 160 N. NV. 173, 175 (1916).
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vagueness of the proposition that it is against the best interests of the public
to hold charitable hospitals liable for the negligence of their medical agents.41
The difficulties which many courts have experienced in ascertaining wheth-
er a particular hospital is charitable or conducted for profit attest the un-
soundness of attempting to differentiate between the two for purposes of
tort liability.42 Even if the general character of a hospital has been estab-
lished as charitable, any distinction seems tenuous when the medical agent
of a charitable hospital negligently injures a paying patient. Some courts
have treated the paying patient in much the same fashion as the patient of
a hospital conducted for profit, and have allowed him to recover so long as
the trust fund itself is not dissipated by his claim ;43 other courts have for-
bidden recourse against the hospital on the ground that the patient was the
beneficiary of a charity even though he paid for his medical services. 44 Argu-
ments similar to those advanced in the case of private hospitals can be ad-
vanced for refusing to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior. But since
both charitable and profit-run hospitals are equally privileged to select their
resident and courtesy staffs,45 there seems to be little reason for excusing
41. Southern Methodist Hospital & Sanatorium of Tucson v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507,
46 P. (2d) 118 (1935) ; Shane v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 2 Cal. App. (2d) 334,
37 P. (2d) 1066 (1934); Cashman v. Meriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 169 Atl. 915
(1933) ; D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 Atl. 340 (1925) ;
Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. (2d) 857 (1936); Roberts v.
Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925).
42. Courts are often forced to examine the articles of incorporation and the financial
records of a hospital to ascertain whether it is charitable or conducted for profit.
Southern Methodist Hospital & Sanitarium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. (2d) 118
(1935); Stewart v. California Medical Association, 178 Cal. 418, 176 Pac. 46 (1918)
(where despite of articles of incorporation a hospital is in fact conducted for profit, it
is neither charitable nor exempt) ; Hamilton v. Corvallis General Hospital Association,
146 Ore. 168, 30 P. (2d) 9 (1934).
43. Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918); Gamble v.
Vanderbilt University, 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510 (1918); McInerny v. St. Luke's
Hospital Association, 122 Minn. 10, 16, 141 N. W. 837, 840 (1913) (charitable hospital
liable for breach of non-delegable duty to put guards on machinery up to amount non-
charity patients paid in) ; Cf. England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 16 Cal. App,
(2d) 640, 61 P. (2d) 48 (1936); Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala,
572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
44. St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Jensen
v. Maine Eye and Ear- Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 At1. 898 (1910); Taylor v. Flower
Deaconess Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922); Lindler v. Columbia
Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (1914) ; Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac.
235 (1913); Roberts v. Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318
(1925) ; Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley, 24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916).
45. Exemptions from "liability should be surrounded by such safeguards as will
prevent the neglect of a duty which the hospital can and should perform . . . it can
and should exercise care to see that only careful and competent servants minister to
stricken patients who are within its walls." Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Hospital,
104 Ohio St. 61, 73, 135 N. E. 287, 291 (1922).
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the former from legal responsibility for the careful selection of those physi-
cians and nurses who are allowed hospital privileges.
In common with other governmental agencies, public hospitals are gener-
ally liable for the torts of their servants only when the state has voluntarily
assumed such liability,40 except in the relatively few instances where courts
have held that maintenance of hospitals is not a governmental function.4 7
Since most states have not consented to being sued by citizens, their hos-
pitals are completely without legal responsibilities. 48 In addition to the immu-
nity resulting from this special legal status, other barriers to liability are
likely to arise in those states which provide by law that any licensed local
physician must be admitted to practice in the local public hospitals.40 Clearly
it would be unreasonable to hold a public hospital even morally responsible
for lack of care in admitting doctors and nurses to hospital privileges if the
hospital is compelled by statute to open its staff to all those entitled to prac-
tice in any given community.50 Yet, in some cases governing bodies have
been able to maintain standards, notwithstanding such laws, by strict super-
vision over hospital practice; in others, the attempt has been made to bar
the incompetent from the hospital.0 ' State courts have, on several occasions,
approved the action of the hospital in excluding unqualified practitioners, 2
and the Supreme Court has ruled that a city has the right to bar a licensed
osteopath from practice in a local public hospital.3 Mr. Justice Stone, speak-
ing for the Court, said that a regulation could not be called unreasonable
46. For a general discussion of the theories of governmental immunity see Borchard,
Government Respon.sibility in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 129, 229, (1926) 36 YI L J. 1,
757, 1039, (1928) 28 Cob. L. Rxv. 577, 734.
47. City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354 (1924); Borwege v. City
of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. IV. 915 (1933). These cases suggest the possi-
bility of evading the statutory immunity in cases of flagrant negligence by declaring that
the hospital was failing to perform a governmental function. But the natural reluctance
to set such a precedent would probably limit the use of such a device to exceptional
cases.
48. Watson v. Atlanta, 136 Ga. 370, 71 S. E. 654 (1911); Tollefson v. City of
Ottawa, 228 IlL 134, 81 N. E. 823 (1907); Butler v. Kansas City, 97 Kan. 239, 155
Pac. 12 (1916); Zachert v. City of Louisville, 214 Ky. 132, 282 S. Mr. 1071 (1926);
City of McAllen v. Gartman, 81 S. W. (2d) 147 (Te. Civ. App., 1935) (full collection
of governmental hospital cases at 149).
49. See e.g., NEv. ComPmED LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 2235. "In the management of
such public hospital (county) no discrimination shall be made against practitioners of
any regular school of medicine and surgery recognized by the laws of Nevada, and all
such regular practitioners shall have equal privileges in treating patients in said hospital."
50. See Lapp, The Liability of the Hospital (1922) 24 TRAsACno.s, A,.tERc,%i
MEDIcAL AssocATioN, 143 at 147.
51. See 1%MAcEAcHEai, HosrrrAL ORGAxIZATIOt AND MAN.,'AGE=ENT (1935) 147.
52. See (1929) 8 TENN. L. Rnv. 58.
53. Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U. S. 414 (1927). But cf. Henderson -. City of
Knoxville, 157 Tenn. 477, 9 S. NV. (2d) 697 (1928) (Court ordered reinstatement to
practice in city hospital of physician found violating medical ethics but not the State
Medical Code).
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if its purpose was to exclude from hospital practice the devotees of some
of the numerous systems or methods of treating disease authorized to prac-
tice in the state.54 In the states where the legislatures and the courts have
not adopted such a view, patients in public hospitals will have to continue
to rely on their own ability to select qualified doctors and nurses.
Most courts carry over the standard rules of hospital liability to industrial
hospitals built by employers for employees, the pivotal question being whether
the particular hospital is to be labelled charitable or profit-making, An em-
ployer who contracts with his employees to furnish medical care or derives
any type of profit from the payroll contributions of the employees to the
hospital has usually been held liable for all the negligent acts of his medical
agents.55 Yet in many cases, employers maintaining similar hospitals, per-
haps with some assistance from employee contributions, have shared the
immunity of charitable hospitals if due care was used in the selection of the
doctors and nurses.50 There is some analogy between a non-profit, incor-
porated industrial hospital partially maintained by employees for their own
benefit and the cooperative hospitals which may become a feature of social-
ized medicine.5 7 Since the criterion in dealing with incorporated associations
seems to be whether or not they are operated for profit,58 cooperative hos-
pitals may conveniently be likened to the incorporated hospital association
supported by employees and thus not liable for the torts of carefully selected
medical agents.
This survey of existing rules of hospital liability suggests the need for
formulating a more comprehensive, uniform rule which will assure qualified
54. TEx. CONsT. Art. XVI, § 31, Tax. ANN. Rav. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art.
4501, 4503, 4510.
55. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Taylor, 16 Ala. App. 241, 77 So. 79 (1917)
(contract to furnish medical attention) ; Phillips v. St. Louis & Santa Fe Ry., 211 Mo,
419, 111 S. W. 109 (1908); Texas & Pacific Coal Co. v. Connaughton, 20 Tex. Civ.
App. 642, 50 S.W. 173 (1899) (profits from hospital fund went to the employer);
Sawdey v. Spokane Falls & Northern Ry., 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 (1902) (liable if
medical service provided for in contract of employment); Mueller v. Winston Brothers
Co., 165 Wash. 130, 4 P. (2d) 854 (1931) (employer liable as he received a benefit though
not any profit from his employee hospital).
56. Union Pacific R. R. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (C. C.A. 8th, 1894); Parsons v.
Yolande Coal and Coke Co., 206 Ala. 642, 91 So. 493 (1921) ; Arkansas Midland R. R.
v. Pearson, 98 Ark. 399, 135 S. W. 917 (1911) (employees did not contemplate that
their contributions would be used to meet tort claims) ; Nicholson v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Hospital Association, 97 Kan. 480, 155 Pac. 920 (1916); Illinois Central R. R.
v. Buchanan, 126 Ky. 288, 103 S. W. 272 (1907) (incidental benefit to the employer
does not make it liable) ; James v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R. R., 153 Miss. 776, 121
So. 819 (1929) ; Wells v. Ferry, 57 Wash. 658, 107 Pac. 869 (1910) (no express con-
tract and no profit to employer). In most of these cases it was held that the employer
must use due care in the selection of the medical staff.
57. See (1938) 47 Y.ALE L. J. 1193.
58. Nicholson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Hospital Association, 97 Kan. 480, 155 Pac,
920 (1916). But see HULBERT, LEGAL PHASES OF COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS (1929) 96;
Andreen v. Escondido Citrus Union, 93 Cal. App. 182, 269 Pac. 556 (1928) (liable for
negligence in fumigating members' orchard).
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medical practitioners in hospitals without discouraging the building and
maintenance of institutions, whether supported by patients or by gifts. Such
a rule would require of all hospitals--charitable and private profit-reason-
able care in providing safe premises, in protecting infants and insane and
delirious patients; and in permitting only competent physicians, surgeons
and nurses the use of hospital facilities; but would exempt all hospitals from
liability for the errors in medical judgment or negligent acts of qualified
doctors and nurses.
The question may be raised why hospitals should not be held strictly liable
for negligence in giving medical attention, thereby forcing them to distribute
the financial burden through insurance against malpractice50 There are,
however, several convincing arguments against such a policy. A patient
injured through negligence can always recover a judgment against the actual
tortfeasor.GO Most hospitals, being more anxious to settle suits than to risk
adverse publicity, are peculiarly subject to spurious suits and if complete
liability prevailed this burden would probably become intolerable.01 Also,
at the present time hospital insurance is increasingly difficult to obtain, par-
ticularly in states reputed to have high rates of malpractice recovery.2
Finally, adequate hospitalization would probably be considerably deterred by
the oppressive addition to operating costs necessitated by insurance cover-
age for all medical agents employed by a hospitalY
c3
59. Charitable hospitals carrying such insurance are nonetheless immune from liability.
Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Moore, 156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (1930); see Knox
County Tuberculosis Sanitarium Inc. v. Moss, 5 Tenn. App. 589, 591 (1927).
60. According to statistics, malpractice suits against doctors and hospitals increased
25% between 1923 and 1933, and at that time the increase was continuing. Martin,
Professional Liability Insurance for Hospitals (1933) 7 BuLL. Amcyxz Hosrxm,.
AssociATioN, no. 7, 10.
61. See Goodnow & Lodge, Hospital Accidents (1911) 12 Aimim; HosPim
AssociATioN 256 at 277; Watson, Hospital Insirance (1923) 25 A.iEtMcA HospimAl,
AssocrA~iox 350 at 351; also 38 id. at 592 (1936); 39 id. at 920 (1937).
62. Communication to the YAim LAW joumx. from the American Hospital Asso-
ciation, September 18, 1938.
63. Different rates of insurance premiums preail throughout the country, since
they are based on the losses and expenses sustained in a given territory over a period of
years. Communication to the YAix LAw JotnuRAL from the United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company, September 21, 1938. The following table is an e.xmple: The policy
allows $5,000 for an accident and $15,000 as a total claim during the policy term. The
bed charge varies from $.75 to $1.50 depending on the number of beds for charitable
hospitals; $1 to $2 for part charity and part pay hospitals; $1.50 to $3. for pay only
hospitals. A rate of $10 is charged for each graduate licensed physician, surgeon, graduate
or under-graduate interne; $15 for each physician using X-ray for diagnosis or treat-
ment; $15 if radium is used and is the property of the hospital; $5 for each technician
giving or assisting in giving X-ray or radium treatments, each laboratory technician,
pharmacist. 63 Bumw, IxsuRANcE PnoDuczas (1930) see. 5. Lloyd's is said to be writ-
ing a special policy at a very low rate at the present time but it is limited to hospitals
approved by the American College of Surgeons. Communication to the YAMz Lm
JouPNAL from THE AsmmcAx HosPrTAL AssocIATioN, September 21, 1938.
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